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INTRODUCTION 
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), the 
Supreme Court took up a hotly contested question: when, if 
ever, do reverse patent settlements violate the antitrust laws? 
Ultimately, a five-justice majority held that these patent 
settlements should be evaluated under a structured version of 
the rule of reason that focuses on: 
(a) The size of the reverse payment “in relation to the 
payor’s anticipated future litigation costs;” 
(b) The “independence” of the payment “from other services 
for which it might represent payment;” and 
(c) The “lack of any other convincing [procompetitive] 
justification.”1 
This structured rule of reason approach mirrors the proof 
my co-author, Einer Elhauge, and I presented in our recent 
article on reverse patent settlements.2 Our proof showed that 
reverse patent settlements necessarily harm consumer welfare 
when: 
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 1. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (noting that 
these factors tend to indicate the likelihood that a reverse payment would 
have anticompetitive effects). 
 2. Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2012). 
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(a) The reverse payment exceeds the payor’s anticipated 
future litigation costs;3 
(b) The size of this reverse payment exceeds the payor’s 
anticipated future litigation costs even after subtracting 
the value of any goods or services the payor received in 
return;4 
(c) There are no countervailing procompetitive 
justifications;5 and 
(d) The alleged infringer either would not have entered “at-
risk” or was not sufficiently judgment-proof.6 
In other words, conditions (a)–(c) in the majority’s opinion 
are essentially identical to conditions (a)–(c) in our proof. In 
particular, the majority specifically focused on the payor’s 
anticipated future litigation costs, rather than all of the payor’s 
litigation costs (including sunk costs) or the alleged infringer’s 
costs.7 Moreover, the majority specifically admonished district 
courts not to attempt to “relitigate” the patent merits (i.e., to 
try to directly determine the probability that the patent would 
have been found valid and infringed),8 and our economic proof 
                                                          
 3. Id. at 304 (“[W]hen a reverse payment exceeds the patent holder’s 
anticipated litigation costs, a court can be confident that the settlement 
exclusion period will exceed he optimal patent reward, while anticompetitively 
reducing consumer welfare as compared either to litigation or to an 
alternative settlement without a reverse payment of that size.”); id. at 305 
(“For the purpose of applying this proof, only the forward-looking anticipated 
litigation costs are relevant; past litigation expenses are sunk costs and thus 
should not affect the patent holder’s willingness to settle.”). 
 4. Id. at 305 (“Other times there is also some return consideration, in 
which case the reverse payment amount is the difference between the 
expected value of the consideration flowing to and from the entrant, leaving 
aside the value of setting the entry date and avoiding litigation costs.”). 
 5. Id. at 309–10 (“Leaving aside cases of judgment-proof entrants, the 
proof above shows that when a settlement does nothing else other than set an 
entry date and provide reverse payments that exceed the patent holder’s 
anticipated litigation costs, then the settlement cannot be justified as 
necessary to reach a settlement that: (a) shortens the expected exclusion 
period (which would increase ex post consumer welfare); or (b) increases the 
patent reward to a level still within the optimal patent exclusion period 
(which would increase ex ante consumer welfare). The reason is that our proof 
precludes those procompetitive justifications. However, in some cases, 
settlements might have unique features that create other procompetitive 
justifications that can offset any anticompetitive effects.”). 
 6. Id. at 307–08. 
 7. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
 8. Id. at 2236–37 (“[A]n antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible 
administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed. The Circuit’s holding 
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provides a guide to courts and economists for exactly how to 
determine whether a particular reverse payment is 
anticompetitive without trying to relitigate the patent merits.9 
Our economic proof thus provides an easily administrable way 
of implementing the majority’s structured rule of reason test 
for reverse patent settlements.10 
In this piece I focus on the questions Actavis left open to 
future courts. In particular, I see at least three tricky questions 
future courts will have to answer when implementing the 
majority’s structured rule of reason analysis: 
A. Are anticompetitive reverse patent settlements 
plausible outside of pharmaceutical markets, where 
Hatch-Waxman does not apply? 
B. What are valid procompetitive efficiencies in reverse 
patent settlement cases? 
C. What is the most accurate way to estimate the 
patentholder’s anticipated future litigation costs? 
A. ARE ANTICOMPETITIVE REVERSE PATENT SETTLEMENTS 
PLAUSIBLE OUTSIDE OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS, WHERE 
HATCH-WAXMAN DOES NOT APPLY? 
The majority spent a large portion of its opinion describing 
how the Hatch-Waxman Act allows a pharmaceutical 
                                                          
does avoid the need to litigate the patent’s validity (and also, any question of 
infringement). But to do so, it throws the baby out with the bath water, and 
there is no need to take that drastic step. That is because it is normally not 
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question . . . . In a 
word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable 
surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a 
detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”). 
 9. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 304 (“This conclusion does not 
rely on any particular level of patent strength . . . or any assumption that the 
parties agreed on that level. Nor does it require knowledge of the parties’ 
varying estimates of patent strength or even knowing which side’s estimate is 
greater. It does not even require us to assume that the parties picked the 
settlement that maximized profits or to make any particular assumption 
about the extent to which the parties considered the risk of antitrust liability. 
It simply requires us to assume that neither party to the patent dispute would 
agree to a settlement that made it worse off.”). 
 10. Though the majority did not bring up the possibility that a reverse 
payment in excess of the patent-holder’s future litigation costs might not 
evince anticompetitive harm when the generic would have entered at-risk and 
was significantly judgment-proof, that likely was simply because there was no 
allegation in Actavis that any of the settling generics were even plausibly 
judgment-proof. 
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patentholder and a potentially infringing generic to settle in a 
way that guts the incentive of other generics to challenge the 
disputed patent.11 This was the majority’s answer to the 
defense’s claim that anticompetitive reverse payment schemes 
are implausible because “a high reverse payment [would] signal 
to other potential challengers that the patentee lacks 
confidence in its patent, thereby provoking additional 
challenges, perhaps too many for the patentee to ‘buy off[.]’”12 A 
future court may therefore wonder whether reverse patent 
settlement payments are plausible when the Hatch-Waxman 
act does not apply. 
Economics shows that the answer is clearly yes. The 
relevant economic proof does not hinge on the Hatch-Waxman 
Act’s unique generic exclusivity provisions.13 Although the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s generic exclusivity period does provide an 
additional entry barrier in the pharmaceutical industry, 
anticompetitive reverse payments are plausible in any industry 
where some barrier prevents more than a few firms from 
challenging the patent.14 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 
convenient legal barrier, but an anticompetitive reverse 
payment scheme would also be plausible in a market where 
technological barriers prevented more than one firm from 
challenging the patentholder. 
For example, Boeing and Airbus are currently each other’s 
only competition in the commercial airliner market.15 Further, 
it would require any other firm an inordinate amount of time 
and resources to enter the commercial airliner market.16 Thus, 
if Boeing entered into an anticompetitive reverse payment 
settlement with Airbus based on a dubious airliner patent, no 
other competitor would plausibly be able to profit from 
                                                          
 11. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227–29, 2235. 
 12. Id. at 2235. 
 13. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 304. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See DATAMONITOR¸ AIRLINES IN THE UNITED STATES: INDUSTRY 
PROFILE 13 (2007) (“The airline industry in the US is characterized by strong 
supplier power; a consequence of the global duopoly of Boeing and Airbus that 
exists in the manufacture of aircraft globally and the fact that, as yet, no 
viable substitute for jet fuel has been discovered.”). 
 16. Id. at 17 (“Entering the market as a new company requires 
considerable capital (for example, to acquire a fleet of planes); and, even for an 
existing company to begin operating in the US, the market may impose 
significant costs in terms of overheads, wages, and so on.”). 
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challenging Boeing’s patent because no other firm would be 
able to actually enter the commercial airliner market even if it 
won the patent case. Boeing would thus be able to pay off all 
potential challengers (here, just Airbus) even though the 
Hatch-Waxman Act does not apply to airliner patents. 
More generally, our proof showed that any payment in 
excess of the patentholder’s anticipated future litigation costs 
necessarily implies that the patentholder thought it would be 
able to pay off enough of its competitors to anticompetitively 
increase its profits.17 There is thus no economic justification for 
limiting the antitrust scrutiny of reverse patent settlements to 
cases in the pharmaceutical market. 
B. WHAT ARE VALID PROCOMPETITIVE EFFICIENCIES IN 
REVERSE PATENT SETTLEMENT CASES? 
Another vital question the majority left open is exactly 
what counts as a valid procompetitive efficiency in reverse 
patent settlement cases. The only “redeeming virtues” the 
Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged were: (a) saved 
litigation costs; and (b) compensation for other services (i.e., the 
payment being for a service from the generic, rather than for 
delay).18 Given that the relevant size of the reverse payment for 
the purposes of comparing it to the patentholder’s future 
anticipated litigation costs is the payment minus the value of 
any other services in return,19 the majority thus really only 
listed one potential procompetitive efficiency: saved litigation 
costs. Consequently, courts may ask under what conditions it is 
                                                          
 17. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 311 (“This same analysis also 
rebuts the claim that anticompetitive effects could be eliminated because 
nonsettling entrants can still challenge the patent. Even though that 
possibility generally exists, our analysis proves that the patent holder would 
never make a reverse payment of this size if nonsettling entrants could—
through entry or patent litigation—create the same constraint on its market 
power. The patent holder would make a reverse payment that exceeds its 
anticipated litigation costs only if excluding the settling entrant confers an 
enhanced market power on the patent holder that it otherwise would not 
enjoy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 18. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 19. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 305 (“Other times there is also 
some return consideration, in which case the reverse payment amount is the 
difference between the expected value of the consideration flowing to and from 
the entrant, leaving aside the value of setting the entry date and avoiding 
litigation costs.”). 
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plausible for a given reverse payment to be necessary for 
settlement. 
When defenders of reverse payments attempt to argue that 
reverse payments are necessary for settlement, they usually 
rely on the basis that settlement can be difficult when the 
patentholder and the generic differed greatly in their estimates 
of the patent’s strength.20 In particular, settlement will be more 
difficult when the patentholder thinks its patent is stronger 
than the generic does (in contrast, if the patentholder thinks its 
patent is weaker than the generic does, this difference in 
estimated patent strength makes settlement easier, not 
harder).21 
However, economic analysis shows that reverse payments 
in excess of the patentholder’s anticipated future litigation 
costs are never necessary to induce procompetitive 
settlements.22 A procompetitive patent settlement is one that 
does not exclude the generic for any longer than the 
probabilistic expected amount of exclusion that would result 
from patent litigation.23 But such a settlement is impossible 
when the reverse payment exceeds the patentholder’s future 
anticipated litigation costs, because such a settlement would 
obviously make the patentholder worse off than just continuing 
to litigate (it would pay more than it would have in litigation 
expenses, but not receive any additional exclusion period).24 
Thus, economic analysis shows that it is possible for reverse 
payments to procompetitively induce settlement only when the 
payment is smaller than the patentholder’s anticipated 
litigation costs. In all other cases, the parties either could have 
settled without a reverse payment, or the settlement must have 
anticompetitively excluded the generic for longer than the 
patent strength merited.25 
                                                          
 20. See, e.g., Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward 
Agreements that Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 655, 660 (2004). 
 21. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 302. 
 22. Id. at 303. 
 23. Id. at 296–304. 
 24. Id. at 299–304. 
 25. Id. at 303. 
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C. WHAT IS THE MOST ACCURATE WAY TO ESTIMATE THE 
PATENTHOLDER’S ANTICIPATED LITIGATION COSTS? 
A third question explicitly left open by the majority is how 
courts should estimate the patentholder’s anticipated future 
litigation costs. This can be tricky because future litigation 
costs have, by definition, not actually occurred. Worse yet, 
defendants have strong incentives to distort their internal 
predictions of their future litigation costs in order to protect 
their lucrative (but anticompetitive) reverse patent 
settlements.26 Reverse payments in future cases will thus 
exceed the patentholder’s own internal estimate of its future 
anticipated litigation costs only in rare cases where the 
patentholder is not aware of the near-automatic antitrust 
liability that would result. Consequently, courts will routinely 
have to turn to other evidence in order to accurately estimate 
the patentholder’s anticipated future litigation costs. 
In prior scholarship, I have suggested two alternative 
types of evidence that can independently show that the 
payment exceeded the patentholder’s anticipated litigation 
costs. First, courts could ask whether the reverse payment 
exceeds the upper bound of litigation costs from similar cases.27 
The economic literature indicates that this threshold is $15 
million for pharmaceutical cases, which is still significantly 
smaller than any of the reverse payments at issue in past 
cases.28 Second, courts could call patent lawyers as expert 
witnesses to provide estimates of how expensive it would have 
been for the patentholder to litigate.29 Although this would 
likely be somewhat expensive, the difficulty of estimating how 
much it would cost to litigate a patent case pales in comparison 
to the difficulty of actually trying to re-litigate the patent. 
 
                                                          
 26. Id. at 306. 
 27. Id. at 306. 
 28. Id. at 305–06. 
 29. Id. at 307. 
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